After long and arduous negations, we and our five negotiating partners, reached an agreement to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons for at least 10-15 years.

In return, Iran gets paid a large sum of money. The agreement is yet to be verified and both supporters and detractors have strong reasons for their positions.

An honest and robust debate between the two camps is vital, especially in evaluating the calculus of “who gave what up to get what.” We need this debate, but we certainly do not need chest-pounding partisan condemnation of the “deal” without methodical examination of its language.

There are certainly “must-ask-questions,” sharply focused on preventing Iran from wielding such an ominous weapon as it pursues its nefarious goals of destabilizing the Middle East to gain more control of it. Seeking a simple “good or bad” answer to such a profoundly vexing geopolitical quagmire is not only silly, it is downright reckless. H. L. Mencken was spot on when he said “to every complex problem, there is a simple answer, and it is always wrong.”

Many detractors reject the entire document “son voire.” Some, however, raise legitimate concerns. The healthiest most democratic strategy for supporters and detractors is to carefully, honestly and dispassionately debate their argument not to win but to find both the truth and weigh the consequences.

This needed debate must also examine the views of the expert nuclear physicists who played a pivotal role in shaping the language of this agreement.

Clearly, all our negotiating partners find the deal to be the best option to achieve our major goal when compared to its competing alternatives.

In addition, a good number of Western nonproliferation advocates and arm control experts seem satisfied with the agreement. However, both Israel and our Sunni Arab allies (Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States) have expressed great concerns and skepticism.

In an article posted on the Arms Control Association’s website with the title “An Effective, Verifiable Nuclear Deal with Iran,” the authors’ conclusion was strongly in favor of the deal warning that efforts to unravel it will allow Iran to accelerate its nuclear program and escape intrusive international monitoring.

Thomas Shea, a veteran former inspector with IAEA, who oversaw the architecture and implementation of safeguards for the world’s evolving nuclear facilities is quoted to say “I’ve been a part of this business for 40 years and I’ve never seen anything that begins to approach its comprehensiveness.”

His reasons are not based on just hunches. They are based on two factors: the type of technology now available to “catch” any, however small, cheating maneuvers by Iran, and the growth of our global geopolitical understanding compared to the days we trusted North Korea.

One of the major technical arguments against the agreement is the “generous” 24 days warning to Iran whenever there is any suspicion of its behavior.

However, with new available technologies, we have the means to have full knowledge of Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain, from its uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies including any effort to clean up.

When we consider military actions to reach our goals, we must be reminded of how wars go in that pesky region we call the Middle East. The race to nuclear armament may not be frank and overt, but it will be far uglier. There is one going on already, and it is ready to multiply exponentially. I mean the protracting proxy wars that claim millions more causalities than a nuclear one might.

It would be a most tragic error if we not only lose the coalition we now have to harness Iran’s ambitious goals of hegemony and domination, but also create a milieu where some of our partners will benefit greatly from selling non-nuclear-but-just-as-deadly weapons to Iran.

There is, of course a logic to the notion of increasing sanctions against Iran until she says uncle, but it is a twisted logic. There are huge hungry mouths for Iranian resources out there who will not be as cooperative in enforcing sanctions as they are today, let alone more.

In fact, we may not able to repeat the efficacy of this coalition for a very long time. I do not believe that anyone will argue against the paradigm “every country has the right to defend itself.” This is fuel that keeps propelling senseless destruction, and it is the refuge argument for all who feel threatened. This is that pesky region we call the Middle East.

Editor’s note: Mohey Mowafy is a retired Northern Michigan University professor.